The Refuse Act of 1899: Key to Clean Water by Sandler, Ross
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1972
The Refuse Act of 1899: Key to Clean Water
Ross Sandler
New York Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 58, Issue 5 (May 1972), pp. 468-471
The Refuse Act of 1899: Key to Clean Water
by Ross Sandier
The Refuse Act of 1899, although
approaching its diamond anniversary,
is alive and well and providing the
best legal framework for cleaning
up the nation's navigable streams
and their tributaries. Its absolute
standard of no pollution, which is
ameliorated through practical
application, is to be preferred over
attempts to provide elaborate
statutory standards.
F OR PERSONS genuinely interestedin the environment and the abate-
ment of water pollution, the last year
or two must surely look like the dawn-
ing of a new age. The distinction be-
tween today's relatively optimistic pic-
ture and the past rests on the emerging
consensus that government must use its
enforcement powers to bring a halt to
pollution and to reclaim our natural
environment. By enforcement I mean
simply that government must use its
power to order pollution halted, and if
it is not halted, to invoke sanctions
swiftly. Direct enforcement against the
polhlter-that has been the real differ-
ence.
The work of enforcement being car-
ried out by the Federal Government
through the Department of Justice, the
Environmental Protection Agency and
the Army Corps of Engineers is built
on an almost common law of water
pollution abatement. The primary fed-
eral statute remains the Refuse Act of
1899 (33 U.S.C. 407), which simply
states, in language that approaches a
Biblical commandment, that no one
may discharge industrial refuse of any
kind into the navigable waters of the
United States or its tributaries.
This act has emerged as the primary
pollution abatement statute on the fed-
eral level for the simple reason that it
alone has proved enforceable. It is axi-
omatic that the certainty of being
caught and punished causes people to
conform to law, not the harshness of
the penalty. And that is the secret of
the Refuse Act's unique success; it
brought certainty and credibility to
pollution law enforcement.
AurTon's NOTE: The opinions expressed in
this article are personal and do not purport
to reflect an official statement by the United
States Department of Justice.
Enforcement means no more than
ordering the polluter to conform to the
desired standard and, on his failing to
meet that standard, imposing sanc-
tions. Under the Refuse Act of 1899
the Federal Government has been
doing precisely this. As many legisla-
tures and the Congress contemplate
pollution abatement legislation, it is
worth taking stock of the accomplish-
ments of the current straightforward
mandate and its direct, enforcement
approach.
Most of the criticism of and propos-
als to alter the Refuse Act relate to ap-
parent deficiencies in the act. The pri-
mary so-called deficiencies are (1) that
it makes no provision for civil abate-
ment but only punishes the wrongdoer;
(2) that it creates no administrative or
investigative machinery; (3) that its
maximum fine of $2,500 is not a deter-
rent; (4) that it does not set standards
for an acceptable level of discharge but
prohibits all discharges of industrial
wastes; and (5) that it makes no pro-
vision for state enforcement.
"Deficiencies" Are Not
Deficiencies At All
In fact, these "deficiencies" are not
deficiencies at all; judicial interpreta-
tion and executive action not only have
removed or avoided them but have
honed the act into the most potent
weapon against water pollution.
The first charge is that the Refuse
Act appears defective because it makes
no provision for civil relief. It reads as
if it were only a criminal provision for
punishment for past conduct but au-
thorizing no power to require a pollu-
ter to abate his pollution. But recent
judicial interpretations have entirely
filled that void. Relying on Supreme
Court cases under companion sections
of the Rivers and Harbor Act which
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held that the government could sue to
enjoin future violations, the Depart-
ment of Justice brought the first two
law suits seeking civil relief under the
Refuse Act in March, 1970-one in
Florida against Florida Power and
Light, and the second in the Southern
District of New York against Oceana
Terminals. In both cases the courts up-
held the Federal Government's right to
sue to enjoin pollution. Since March of
1970, the Department of Justice has
brought ninety additional civil actions.
The civil relief obtained has been
designed to abate the particular pollu-
tion at issue. In United States v.
Oceana Terminals, 70 Civ. 1172 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970), where the problem was oil
leaching into the East River from an
oil saturated shore, the defendant was
required to maintain an adequate con-
tainment boom and to clean the oil
from the water continuously, while at
the same time he was required to re-
pair the underground leaks from his
tanks. In United States v. Marathon
Battery, 70 Civ. 4110 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
the defendant was required to install
pretreatment equipment to remove the
toxic metal cadmium from its effluent.
In United States v. General Motors, 70
Civ. 5469 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the de-
fendant was required by the court
order to cease discharging entirely
many toxic chemicals and to obtain
primary and secondary treatment of its
remaining wastes.
Civil relief requires the defendant to
invest substantial amounts of capital
for new equipment or for alteration of
its manufacturing processes. The
money invested does not always repre-
sent unrecapturable expenses, however.
In the Marathon case, the illegally dis-
charged waste was cadmium, the firm's
primary raw material and an extremely
expensive metal. It is now being cap-
tured from the effluent before dis-
charge. In another case brought in the
Southern District of New York, United
States v. Washburn Wire Company, 70
Civ. 4624 (1971), the discharge into
the East River proved so valuable that
the defendent has barreled the effluent
with the intent of selling it.
The Refuse Act appears defective in
that it creates no laboratories, no
investigative arms and no enforcement
machinery. No administrative program
is included to process and evaluate per-
mit applications. So goes the second
charge.
These defects were corrected in large
measure by Executive Order 11,571 of
December 23, 1970, which established
the Refuse Act permit program, and by
the creation and reorganization of the
Environmental Protection Agency. 1
But one of the strongest tools of en-
forcement arises directly from the Re-
fuse Act itself without special procla-
mations or funding. The Refuse Act is
a criminal statute, and violation of it
may be investigated in the same man-
ner as any criminal conduct-by a
grand jury. In the Southern District of
New York, United States Attorney
Whitney North Seymour, Jr., empa-
neled a special grand jury to investi-
gate water pollution in September,
1970. It has indicted fifteen companies
and investigated many more.
Grand Jury Wields
Significant Power
The grand jury can subpoena any-
one it wishes to testify. This is a signif-
icant power. Most potential defendants
are corporations and do not enjoy a
Fifth Amendment privilege. In the
past, and even today, much of the
investigative work by the Corps of En-
gineers began and ended with a boat
ride and a glass jar of some noxious
smelling liquid. But the grand jury can
circumvent that procedure of evidence
gathering entirely. It simply subpoenas
the corporation's responsible officials
and asks them to explain under oath
just what chemicals and other refuse
the plant discharges.
This method of investigation has the
added advantage for the prosecutor
that the defendant cannot readily chal-
lenge the evidence against him. Most
indictments are based on admissions
by corporate officials to the grand jury
or on tests made by the defendant at
the request of the grand jury. By the
end of the investigation, there is little
left for the defendant to dispute, and,
as has been our experience, practically
all defendants enter guilty pleas.
Ultimately the issuance of a permit
Ross Sandier was graduated from
Dartmouth College (A.B. 1961) and
New York University School of Law
(LL.B. 1965). He serves as an As-
sistant United States Attorney and
Chief of the Environmental Protection
Unit in the Southern District of New
York.
by the Corps of Engineers will be a
complete defense to a Refuse Act pros-
ecution. That is not to be feared. The
Corps and the EPA have made it clear
that they intend to issue permits only
on condition that the discharger receiv-
ing the permit meet appropriate water
quality standards and not violate other
environmental values. In addition, the
Corps and EPA have asserted the right
1. In Kalor v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.
D. C. 1971), the court enjoined the Corps
of Engineers from issuing any Refuse Act
permits until such time as the Corps amends
its regulations to require the filing of an
environmental impact statement, as required
by the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 with respect to each permit. The De-
partment of Justice has stated that it intends
to appeal the lower court ruling, and the
Corps, on December 28, 1971, ordered a
moratorium on the issuance of permits, but
stated that permit applications will continue
to be received and evaluated.
On February 2, 1972, the Council on En-
vironmental Quality and the EPA jointly
recommended to the House of Representatives
that the pending Federal Water Pollution
Control Act explicitly exempt Refuse Act
permits from the N.E.P.A. requirements.
Among other reasons the agencies noted that
potentially 20,000 additional N.E.P.A. state-
ments would be needed if the Kalor decision
were upheld and that the EPA, as an agency
charged with protecting the environment,
should be exempt from N.E.P.A. require-
ments geared for agencies charged with
other functions and duties.
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to attach conditions amounting to
abatement orders to permits.2 The ap-
plications on which the permits will be
based specify precisely the nature of
the discharge. Deviation from these
specifications will open the discharger
to prosecution. In time, the role of the
Department of Justice in investigating
and prosecuting polluters will no doubt
diminish as the EPA and the Corps be-
come more effective. But the ultimate
criminal sanction will remain to give
force to the administrative regulation.
The third alleged deficiency is that
the Refuse Act appears on first reading
to create nothing more than a misde-
meanor and is a statute essentially
lacking in a credible punishment. The
statute provides that if convicted, a de-
fendant can be fined a minimum of
$500 and a maximum of $2,500. In the
unusual case in which the defendant is
a natural person, lie can receive a term
of imprisonment of not less than thirty
days nor more than one year. Yet the
statute has ample teeth, because defend-
ants are routinely charged with multi-
ple counts based on the actual work-
ings of the defendant's plant. If a plant
has one shift a day and the polluting
discharge virtually stops with the end-
ing of that shift, each day becomes a
separate count in the indictment or in-
formation.
Recently in the Southern District of
New York a defendant felt the full im-
pact of this aspect of the Refuse Act
(71 Cr. 1020 (1970) ). Anaconda Wire
& Cable Company, a subsidiary of Ana-
conda, routinely discharged large
amounts of copper from its plant in
Hasting-on-Hudson. The metal, which
is highly toxic to virtually all life, was
discharged from the plant as traces in
its process water. The grand jury
charged Anaconda with one hundred
separate violations of the Refuse Act
-an alleged violation on practically
every working day in the first half of
1971. Anaconda pleaded guilty to the
indictment, and was fined $2,000 per
count for a total fine of $200,000-a
record fine in a pollution case. There is
no doubt that a fine of such severity
has the desired impact of deterence.
Other fines imposed in the Southern
District have been relatively as severe,
running as high as $25,000, $50,000
or, as in the case of United States v.
Standard Brands, $125.000 (70 Cr.
858 (1970)).
Size of Fine Is Left
to Court's Discretion
The size of the fine is entirely a mat-
ter of the court's discretion. The court
has the traditional power to suspend
imposition or execution of the fine and
can place the defendant on probation.
It is clear, though, fron the size and
severity of the fines imposed on de-
fendants in the Southern District of
New York and in other districts that
judges are aware of the significance of
pollution prosecutions and will impose
a fine sufficient to achieve prevention
and deterence.
The fourth charge is that the Refuse
Act appears defective because it has no
standards of any kind written into it. It
merely states that it is unlawful to dis-
charge refuse.
The absence of fixed standards of
acceptable levels of discharge bothers
many people, and in large measure the
legislation now pending in Congress is
an attempt to create standards. The
most prominent bill is S. 2770, the so-
called Muskie Bill, which passed the
Senate by an 86 to 0 vote on Novem-
ber 2, 1971. It proposes that the ad-
ministrator of [he EPA establish a cat-
alogue of standards for most effluents
as well as a catalogue of available tech-
nology for certain types of pollutants.
It also establishes a goal of elimination
of all pollution discharges by 1985.
The Muskie Bill does not call for the
repeal of the Refuse Act, which would
presumably remain as a parallel en-
forcement statute.
Russell E. Train and William D.
Ruckelshaus, the respective heads of
the Council of Environmental Quality
and the EPA, have noted this duality
and explicitly recommended that the
Refuse Act ultimately be repealed ex-
cept as it applies to anchorage and
navigation. "I The principal reason for
this position is that the two statutes
potentially subject the discharger to
two distinct standards. It would ap-
pear, however, that this potential has
remained entirely theoretical.
The current Department of Justice
guidelines require the United States at-
torneys to refer all cases to the Corps
of Engineers and the EPA for their
opinion as to whether there is a factual
basis for a Refuse Act action. The De-
partment of Justice, which is without
technical support staffs, relies directly
on the facilities of the EPA laborato-
ries and scientists. Virtually no sub-
stantial pollution case can be pressed
without highly sophisticated evidence
and testing-a requirement that inevi-
tably forces the dovetailing of stand-
ards as between the prosecutor and the
environmental specialist. Literally hun-
dreds of criminal and civil cases have
been prosecuted in the absence of a
catalogue of fixed standards, and not
in a single case has a defendant seri-
ously contended that the absence of a
standard misled him. It has not pre-
vented the court from fashioning relief.
Refuse Act Does
Have a Standard
The Refuse Act, of course, does have
a standard-no discharge at all of in-
dustrial refuse. The flat prohibition ap-
pears harsh and unprecedented, but it
is neither. As in other areas where per-
nicious conduct or laws affect matters
of central importance, the courts have
tended to reach parallel results. In the
reapportionment cases, for instance,
the flat rule of one man, one vote
emerged as the standard.
More important, the actual practice
of prosecutors, judges and administra-
tors generally has been to adopt the
only standard thai as a practical mat-
ter can work-the maximum feasible
abatement under the present technol-
ogy. That is the standard for the relief
sought in civil actions brought in the
Southern District of New York, and
that is the standard for abatement
sought by the EPA in evaluating per-
mit applications.
This standard is the only sensible
one from an enforcement point of
view. The Department of Justice has
no power to order anyone to do any-
2. 33 C.F.R. 209.131; 36 Fed. Reg. 6564
(April 7, 1971).
3. Letter of Russell E. Train and William
D. Ruckelshaus, February 2, 1972, 2 Env.
Rptr. 1247.
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thing. It can only take a defendant to
court for the purpose of convincing a
court either to impose a fine or to
order the defendant to cease discharg-
ing and clean up the effects of past dis-
charges. In either situation, the prose-
cutor must convince the court that the
defendant has done or is doing some-
thing that should be halted. That bur-
den, as a practical matter, is insur-
mountable if the defendant can estab-
lish that it has taken every precaution
and in fact has abated its pollution to
the maximum currently feasible.
There could be situations in which
every conceivable precaution had not
abated the discharge entirely. In my
experience prosecution of this kind of
case is completely hypothetical. Re-
sources do not permit prosecution of
these minimal polluters. There are far
more polluters readily available who
yet practice nineteenth cenlury indus-
trial mores. Reliance on the prosecutor
to be sensible is part of the system of
criminal justice and is not in the least
unusual. In the last analysis, the abuse
of discretion can only bring a defend-
ant to court. There the prosecutor, in
an open public proceeding, must bear
his burden of demonstrating to the
court that a fine or an injunction
should be ordered.
Moreover, the primary rationale for
a standard is not present in the pollu-
tion area. Companies desire standards
in order to predict what will be an ac-
ceptable level of abatement. But stand-
ards are changing constantly. What
today seems to he an acceptable level
most likely will not be considered so in
the future. For a company to install
pollution abatement equipment meet-
ing an outmoded standard is fool-
hardy. If it does not install the most
advanced equipment available, regard-
less of the current written standard, it
is wasting money.
The standard now found in the Ref-
use Act makes sense most of all be-
cause it is enforceable. It is a standard
readily comprehensible to everyone, in-
dustrialist and citizen alike. At a time
when pollution of practically all major
waterways is plainly visible, the Refuse
Act offers hope for meaningful abate-
ment. Its clear commandment places
the burden directly on the discharger
either to cease discharging or to take
every precaution currently available to
eliminate contaminants from his ef-
fluent. Equally important, it mandates
that the enforcement officials take ac-
tion. Neither can hide behind disputes
about relative toxicity, and neither
can buy time awaiting the ultimate
standard and the ultimate black box to
eliminate the noxious portion of a dis-
charge. It is unlikely that "zero" dis-
charge can ever be achieved; it is
equally unlikely that setting a lesser
standard will produce more or better
abatement.
The fifth allegation is that the Ref-
use Act appears defective in that it
does not settle which government au-
thority-the states or the Federal Gov-
ernment-has priority of enforcement.
Whereas most recent federal legislation
implicitly or explicitly defers to the
states, the Refuse Act is silent. The Ref-
use Act follows the traditional crimi-
nal law theory that certain conduct,
even if punishable under state law,
might also be punished as a federal
crime if constitutionally permitted con-
tacts exist, as, for instance, receiving
stolen goods (state crime) and receiv-
ing stolen goods that have moved in in-
terstate commerce (federal crime).
Absence of Pecking
Order Is No Defect
The absence of a pecking order is no
defect at all. Surely no one would con-
tend that there has been too much en-
forcement in the pollution area. The
experience is quite the contrary. More
important, concurrent jurisdiction has
decided advantages. A United States
attorney vigorously enforcing the Ref-
use Act cannot help but cause the
competitive (or self-protective) fires to
ignite in local and state enforcement
agencies. The same competition works
between the EPA and the United States
attorney offices, as well as between
United States attorneys in neighboring
districts. While it may not be obvious
to even the most well-informed people,
this has been one of the most impor-
tant products of the Refuse Act. In
Refuse Act of 1899
probably no other area has competi-
tion fostered by concurrent jurisdic-
tion had a more beneficial effect. The
Refuse Act is necessary and has been
successful on this basis alone-actions
under it proved enforcement possible
and desirable and made others uncom-
fortable if they were not being equally
as tough.
Refuse Act Is a Superior
Enforcement Tool
The Refuse Act has developed into a
superior enforcement tool for the bet-
terment of our environment. An exami-
nation of the record of enforcement
bears this out. Criminal indictments
are being voted increasingly by grand
juries around the country. In the two
years ending July 1, 1969, eighty-seven
criminal cases were brought under the
act, but in the next two years almost
four times as many criminal actions
were brought-a total of 320. Once
convicted, defendants can expect a sub-
stantial fine. As Judge Thomas F.
Croake stated when he imposed the
$200,000 fine on Anaconda, no longer
can pollution fines be viewed as merely
a cost of doing business. These actions
bring credibility to the commitment to
clean up. Without the certainty of
being caught and punished, there is lit-
tle left to that commitment, no matter
how grand the administrative machin-
ery or how stringent the standards.
If I were to grade the importance of
the Refuse Act and enforcement under
it, I would list these things as the most
important, above even the significant
successes of individual cases:
-It has and is creating a climate in
which industry-the potential defend-
ants-now feels a growing certainty
that it can no longer pollute with im-
punity.
-It has and is creating a climate in
which local and state agencies can be-
come more stern in their enforcement
policies.
Much remains to be done. But there
could not be a more explicit mandate
than is now found in the Refuse Act,
nor could that be a more workable
scheme of enforcement than is now
evolving under the present statute.
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